Pakistani Democracy: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

By M. A. Muqtedar Khan and Kamran Bokhari

A senior Pakistani political figure was visiting Washington DC recently. In a gathering at a prominent think tank the dignitary expressed concern about the future of democracy in Pakistan. The politician warned that mainstream moderate political parties such as the Pakistan People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif faced the prospects of political oblivion. The politician argued that President Mushrraf's various strategies to consolidate his power were enabling the Islamist coalition, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), to entrench.

The politician expressed the fear that unless something was done soon (ostensibly by Washington) President Musharraf would consolidate his own position at the helm of Pakistani affairs, and the Islamist alliance, which is not only the second biggest party in the National Assembly after the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), but also governs two of the four provinces, will become stable and will be poised to make further gains in the near future.

Prior to the elections in 2002 Islamists had never had much success at the polls, but the variety of eligibility rules introduced by President Mushraraf in 2002 helped the Islamist coalition while simultaneously hurting the leaders and the rank and file of mainstream political parties. One such critical rule was the stipulation that only people with undergraduate degrees could contest elections, while recognizing madrasa education as equivalent to a college degree. Ironically this rule undermines the entire debate on the need for the reform of madrasa education.

Before their breakthrough victory in 2002, Pakistani Islamists had enjoyed political influence only under dictators. Interestingly, regardless of the political orientation of the dictators—whether it was an Islamist-leaning general like Zia-ul-Haq or a secular General like Parvez Musharraf— Islamists found themselves in a more advantageous position than under secular democratic governments. As a result Pakistani Islamists have a lukewarm attitude towards democracy.

Under General Zia, the Islamist parties had limited power, and that too only at the pleasure of the General. He gave them preeminence, and they legitimized him. In the current order, the Islamists are not only in charge of two provinces but their power ostensibly comes not from the direct benevolence of the dictator but from electoral victories facilitated by the dictator. This has put the Islamist alliance (MMA) on a much firmer ground. Their only weakness is the faultiness within the coalition that includes both moderate and radical Islamists.

If they remain in power for an extended period of time, then they could make two important gains:

1. they will become adept at managing the potentially fragile alliance and develop a stable Islamist political block and
   
2. they will learn the art of governance, and their future political manifestos will become more substantive—reflecting their experience at governance—and less rhetorical, making them look more moderate and increase their appeal and electoral prospects.

These possibilities have made Pakistani secular democrats understandably nervous.

The visiting politician was also worried at the prospect that the public perception of the Islamist provincial administrations as relatively corruption-free and pious could undermine the future of the secular parties if the status quo was allowed to prevail for an extended period.

We were surprised and ashamed at this concern expressed by secular politicians who advertise themselves as the true moderates. Rather than seeing the low corruption of Islamists as a challenge and gear up to promise and deliver corruption free governance, secular democrats seem to be resigned to the fact that they cannot compete with Islamists when it comes to honesty in political management.

This secular politician, while lamenting the decline of democracy in Pakistan as a result of General Musharraf's iron grip on power, suggested that Washington should intervene and call for an early election to subvert the current order and prevent the Islamist alliance (MMA) from consolidating its position.

We fear for the future of democracy in Pakistan. On one hand there are the champions of democracy, the secular democrats, who are willing to subvert democracy for political gains, and on the other hand, there are the Islamists whose democratic credentials are suspect. So we are caught between those who while being committed to the democratic process are detrimental to it because of their corrupt ways and those who may offer clean governance but are dangerous because of their ideological intransigence.

Thus both groups could derail democratization.

General Parvez Musharraf's government is providing mixed results. While his stay at the helm undermines democracy, it is also providing Pakistan a window to a less corrupt polity. While it is keeping the rogue Islamists (Jihadists) at bay, it has facilitated moderate Islamists into positions that could provide them significant long-term political gains.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan is Chair, Political Science Department at Adrian College and Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution (www.ijtihad.org). Kamran A. Bokhari is an Analyst covering the Middle East & South Asia at Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (stratfor.com) and a doctoral student at Howard University.