Wahhabism and the Illusion of a Golden Age

Wahhabism: A Critical Essay by Hamid Algar (2002) Islamic Publications International.

By Sadik H. Kassim

In recent years, much has been written about Wahhabism in the mainstream press. Just to see how much newsprint has been expended on the subject, I did a Lexis Nexis database search covering the archives of hundreds of major international newspapers, magazines and journals, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, Newsweek, Time, and The Economist. The results of the search are depicted graphically below. As can be seen, Wahhabism was barely a blip on the screen during the late 70’s, the entirety of the 80’s and most of the 90’s.

This period, it will be recalled, was the height of American government support for the reactionary Wahhabi-inspired Islamist movements of Afghanistan, whose members Ronald Reagan dubbed “freedom fighters”. These were America’s guys. Critical analysis of their specific beliefs, methods, or financial backing by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and America were off limits to the sycophantic press. In fact, of the 305 articles that turned up, 241 of them or 79% of total articles were written post 9/11. After September 11, when their utility had expired, the Wahhabists and the offshoots they produced were discarded into history’s waste bin of American allies gone bad (see Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, etc.). It was now proper to write about them. Even the fashion magazine Interior Design got into the game, scoring a hit for a December 1, 2001 article making a snide reference to Wahhabism.

Despite the upsurge in the number of articles, the topic is still treated very superficially. Wahhabis are often described in clichéd terms as being the “Puritans” of the Muslim world. An analogy I have never liked. True the Puritans espoused a literal interpretation of scriptural texts; beyond that, however the similarities are minimal. The Puritans were intellectual heavyweights coupling Renaissance humanism with knowledge of scriptures and divinity. They complemented their religious readings with the Greek classics of Cicero, Virgil, Terence and Ovid. In addition to writing the first children books, they emphasized public schooling for all and founded Harvard, the first American university. For them, religion provided a stimulus and prelude for scientific thought. Among their members, they could count numerous fellows of the Royal Society of London. Most importantly, the Puritans were political and religious outcasts.  

The Wahhabis certainly are not Puritans in any true sense of the word. The more apt comparison, I believe, is the evangelical Christian movement in modern times. Both the Wahhabis and the Evangelicals champion an ultra-literalist interpretation of the holy texts, casting them both at odds with the precedents set by their ancestors and with their co-religionists in modern times. Both Evangelicals and Wahhabis shun scientific/rational thought and treat the idea of a renewed interpretation of religious texts as anathema. Both groups have tremendous financial resources enabling the rapid spread of their beliefs. Most importantly, both have disproportionate access to the corridors of power—the Evangelicals and their incestuous relationship with the Bush administration, the Wahhabis and the Saudi royal family, although the latter is in a state of flux.

Another problem with the recent spate of articles is the lack of mention of the West’s implicit support for Wahhabism via its alliance with the Saudis. This was one of the problems with Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 as well, which depicts strong support for Saudi Arabia as being characteristic of the Bush family dynasty only.

The relationship in fact had its genesis in 1915 with the successful signing of the Anglo-Saudi treaty. Upon signing the treaty, Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa’ud, the founder of the modern nation of Saudi Arabia, received 1,000 rifles, a £20,000 signing bonus, a monthly subsidy of £5,000 and regular shipment of machine guns and rifles. The deferential treatment given to Ibn Sa’ud by the British helped the Sa’ud family defeat the other tribes of Arabia and consolidate their rule in the Peninsula. In return, Ibn Sa’ud agreed not to “enter into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power” and to refrain from aggression in the British held areas of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. The relationship continued until 1924.

After World War I and with the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula, both the British and Americans started courting Ibn Sa’ud. The oil concession was signed over to American Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) in 1933. In 1943, the American-Saudi alliance was further solidified with Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of the kingdom as being “vital for the defense of the USA,” qualifying it to receive American aid under the Lend-Lease Act. The final nail in the Saudi-British alliance came in 1945 when Ibn Sa’ud personally met with Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy and guaranteed American access to the Peninsula’s vast oil resources. The rest of the western relationship with the family of Sa’ud is well-documented in the public record, and will not be detailed here.  

With all of this in mind, I was very excited to receive Hamid Algar’s new book, actually pamphlet, entitled Wahhabism; A Critical Essay for review. I had high expectations that Algar would blast away the clichés and superficialities and get to the essence of Wahhabism. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Although well written, the work suffers from several major flaws. Algar omits or barely covers key historical events in the development of Wahhabism, does little to put the subject within a relevant modern context, and most importantly, underestimates the ubiquity of Wahhabi thoughts and practices in the Muslim world today.

Hamid Algar, a Cambridge trained professor of Islamic Studies at Berkley, starts his essay with a brief biographical sketch of the founder and namesake of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a man whom the British explorer/Standard Oil agent, Harry St. John Philby, dubbed the “co-founder” of Saudi Arabia.

Born in the small town of al-Uyaynah in the eastern part of modern day Saudi Arabia in 1703 to a family of religious scholars, Abd al-Wahhab spent most of his early years traveling in the pursuit of a religious education. He was particularly fond of the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval Syrian scholar who delighted in writing polemics against Christianity, Shi’ism and Sufism. Yet unlike Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya was in the words of Algar “a notable figure in the history of Islam…a far more rigorous and careful thinker and an infinitely more prolific scholar.” Abd al-Wahhab’s scholarly output was scant and simple. His masterpiece, a slim collection of hadiths with no original analysis or commentary entitled Kitab al-Tawhid, has “the appearance of a student’s notes.”

Eventually Abd al-Wahhab made his way back to Uyaynah where he joined his father, a notable religious judge at the time, and began to preach against the religiously aberrant practices he had seen during his travels. Among other things, Abd al-Wahhab inveighed against smoking tobacco and declared trees to be Haram (religiously objectionable), as an appreciation of their beauty could lead to kufr (unbelief).

Particularly galling to Abd al-Wahhab was the visitation of tombs, especially those of sacred personages. Although initially sympathetic to the ideas of Abd al-Wahhab, the leader of Uyaynah was eventually compelled to expel him out of the village because his teachings and behavior began to antagonize the people of the town. Specifically, Abd al-Wahhab’s public stoning of a local woman accused of adultery angered many of the villagers. The expulsion however would prove to be fortuitous.

Abd al-Wahhab arrived in Dir’iyyah, a village forty miles away from Uyaynah, where the tribal chief Muhammad ibn Sa’ud welcomed him. This was a major turning point in the history of Wahhabism, yet Algar brushes over the events at Dir’iyyah. As Madawi Al-Rasheed reminds us in her excellent A History of Saudi Arabia, it was here that Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa’ud formed an alliance. Specifically, Ibn Sau’d pledged to protect Abd al-Wahhab if he paid allegiance to the tribe of Ibn Sa’ud. Abd al-Wahhab agreed, and with that the scene was set for the emergence of a religious emirate in central Arabia. Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings "impregnated the Saudi leadership with a new force, which proved to be crucial for the consolidation and expansion of Saudi rule." Wahhabism promised the Saudi leadership clear benefits in the form of “political and religious authority and material rewards, without which the conquest of Arabia would not have been possible.”

Under the banner of religious purification, the nascent Wahhabi-Saudi alliance formally declared jihad against the “nonbelievers” in 1746: the “nonbelievers” being all who did not adhere to the precise doctrines of Wahhabism, including Muslims.

Those who accepted Wahhabism were "expected to swear allegiance to its religio-political leadership and demonstrate their loyalty by agreeing to fight for its cause and pay zakat to its representatives." Those who resisted the Wahhabi-Saudi encroachment were “subjected to raids that threatened their livelihoods.” Using such tactics, the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance was able to create a quasi-tribal confederation enabling them to conquer and consolidate vast regions of the Arabian Peninsula. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Sa’ud died in 1791 and 1766 respectively leaving behind them a legacy of greed, ruthlessness and intolerance.

The Wahhabi-Saudi state waxed and waned for years before being officially declared in 1932. Each periodic re-emergence was more ruthless than the one before it. Algar notes that the second Wahhabi-Saudi conquest for example, which lasted between 1824 and 1891, “came at a cost of 400,000 killed and wounded.” Furthermore, it is said that the governors of the various provinces appointed by Ibn Sa’ud “carried out 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations in the course of subduing the peninsula.”

Although Algar gives a good overview of the Wahhabi/Saudi alliance in the 19 century, he brushes over key historical events that have affected the nature of the alliance since. The 1902 oath of allegiance is one such example. Through the pledge of 1902, Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa’ud extracted loyalty from the Wahhabi religious specialists (mutawwa’a), who were independent up until this time, by paying them a salary. Abd al-Wahhab, to his credit, had always refused monetary compensation for religious service, considering such transactions as bribes compromising the impartiality of the mutawwa’a. The 1902 allegiance, however, transformed the mutawwa’a from full time religious specialists to vassals loyal to Ibn Sa’ud and the al–Sa’ud family and dependent on their resources. In return, Ibn Sa’ud was guaranteed religious legitimacy and a loyal police force that could subdue the population and collect Zakat for the royal family, thereby allowing the consolidation of Sa’udi authority in Arabia. This relationship however has suffered periodic setbacks.

Take, for example,  the 1979 Mecca uprising led by Juhayman ibn Muhammad al-Utayabi to which Algar devotes only one paragraph. Juhayman, an active preacher, protested against the relations of the Saudis with the ‘infidel powers,’ the materialism and corruption of the monarchy, and the relationship between the ulama and the Saudi royal family. He attracted a following of nearly 200, declared the movement’s spiritual leader, Muhammad al-Qahtani, to be the Mahdi and demanded the removal of the royal family.

In response, the Saudi state’s well-compensated “ulama,” lead by Shaykh ibn Baz, issued a fatwa supporting the Saudi royal family and authorizing military intervention in the sacred precincts of the Ka’ba. The fatwa justified the brutal suppression that followed, which culminated in the shedding of blood inside the holy mosque.

Juhayman’s legacy however was not as easily quashed. His accusations resonated through a significant swath of Saudi society and “highlighted the contradiction between the Islamic rhetoric and credentials of the Saudi state and its prolonged relationship with the West.” This was the first major challenge to the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy since the founding of the kingdom. The Royal family heeded the warning bells and acted quickly to maintain their authority. Mohammed al-Obaidi, Secretary General of the tourism board in the Asir province of Saudi Arabia, summed up the significance of the episode best when he stated that ''The royal family cut off Juhayman's head, but implemented his entire agenda.  They said what the hell: it won't mess with our power.  Let the society have what it wants. ''

After providing a brief sketch of Abd al-Wahhab’s life, Algar delves into an exposition of Abd al-Wahhab’s scant teachings. Algar pins the cornerstones of Wahhabi ideology as being the concepts of tawhid al-ibada (directing all worship to Allah alone) and bid’a (innovation in religious matters).

Tawhid al-ibada in its proper sense attempts to demarcate acts of worship appropriate for a Muslim. Violations of these rather arbitrary limits take place whenever an act of devotion involves an intermediary between the worshipper and Allah. It is within this context that petitionary prayers (du’aa) which mention the Prophet or visitations to the tombs of sacred personages (ziyara) are deemed religiously unacceptable. Violations of tawhid al-ibada are grave sins casting the violator as a mushrik (polytheist). Because the Wahhabi formulation of Tawhid al-ibada can be defined only negatively, in terms of the avoidance of certain practices, it leads to a “fear of perceived deviation at the very heart of Wahhabism and helps to explain its intrinsically censorious nature.”

Deviations from the fundamentals of tawhid al ibada are categorized as bid’a, which in the strictest sense is defined as an innovation in religious matters-specifically, any religious practice or concept that had its genesis after the third century of the Islamic era. Acts of bi’da were rife in society, according to Abd al-Wahhab, and included practices ranging from the rituals of the Sufi orders, to the commemoration of the birthday of the Prophet, to the recitation of religious poetry (qasida). Because bid’a was ubiquitously manifest in Muslim society, the Umma needed to be periodically purified-through force if necessary. Abd al-Wahhab was therefore at war with both his ancestors and his contemporaries. This was all justified, in Abd al-Wahhab’s view, by certain hadiths, which allude to the appearance of a mujaddid (“renewer”) once every hundred years, a title that Abd al-Wahhab proudly claimed.

Algar notes that in modern times, the Wahhabis have used Saudi petrodollars rather than force to spread their beliefs. Using various front organizations such as the Muslim World League, and at one time the Muslim Students Association of North America and ISNA in the United States, Wahhabi-esque ideas have permeated the philosophies of certain groups, such as the Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jama’at-I Islami of Pakistan. Yet this does not mean that Wahhabism has been universally accepted. Algar points out that “in many parts of the Middle East, the Sufi orders have shown a resilience and vitality that have confounded Western scholars alike.” Although Algar does not elaborate on this point, it is a story that needs to be told, as it shows that the Wahhabi influence on Islam is amenable to defeat, that there are antidotes to its metastatic spread. The case of the Yihewanis in China is one such example, which will have to be saved for another day.

In the book’s final chapter, Algar writes that it is “inaccurate, irresponsible, and dangerous to paint a picture of American Muslims as being in their majority Wahhabi,” which contrary to the poisonous writings of Daniel Pipes, Steve Emerson and others is absolutely correct. However, Algar continues by writing that it is equally dangerous to conflate “Salafi” with “Wahhabi” making a distinction between the two, identifying Salafis as being more diplomatic in approach, choosing “persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other Muslims to their cause.”

This may have been true when the ideals of Salafism were first formulated by Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al Deen al Afghani and others, but as the eminent Khalid Abou El Fadl correctly observes, “Wahhabi thought exercised its greatest influence not under its own label, but under the rubric of Salafism.” The distinction between the two in modern times is null. This is an important point, because if we are to combat the crippling influence of Wahhabism on Islam today, we must recognize how ubiquitous many of its calcified tenets are in the Muslim world today and not engage in exercises of semantic gymnastics trying to differentiate Wahhabism from Salafism from Deobandism, etc…We must recognize that all of these movements, suffused with Abdul Wahhab’s spirit, have contributed to a virulent and parochial Islam that has gained currency with many throughout the world.

As Khalid Abou El Fadl reminds us, “Even a cursory examination of predominant ideas and practices reveals the widespread influence of Wahhabi thought on the Muslim world today.” The success of Wahhabi/Salafi ideas lie in their appeal to a very basic concept in Islam, “that Muslims ought to follow the precedent of the Prophet and his companions (al salaf al-salih)” only. This was the Golden Age of Islam. Yet such thinking is intrinisically flawed because, as Abou El Fadl notes, by emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the adherents of Salafism (Wahhabism) effectively idealize the time of the Prophet and his companions, and ignore or demonize the balance of Islamic history. Critical historical inquiry effectively gets thrown out and the challenges of modernity are responded to by escaping to “the secure haven of the text.” By underrating the achievements of the past, the Wahhabis/Salafis devalue all those which still remain to be accomplished.

The problem with Wahhabism as with any movement that attempts to distill historical insights into an ideology or strategy is that the movement risks becoming a caricature of its own best instincts. History should be a guide, not the objective. There is not historical panacea.  Better to put our collective shoulder to the wheel rather than pine for phantom Golden Ages, which can easily be manipulated by people with questionable motives. I have always liked Rousseau’s take on the matter. In his Tristes Tropiques, Claude Lévi-Strauss cites Rousseau as writing:

“If men have always been concerned with only one task -- how to create a society fit to live in -- the forces which inspired our distant ancestors are also present in us.  Nothing is settled; everything can still be altered.  What was done but turned out wrong, can be done again. The Golden Age, which blind superstition had placed behind [or ahead of] us, is in us.”

The golden age of Islam does not lie in the Prophet’s Medina, nor as some people have suggested Cordoba between the 8 to 14 century, or Baghdad during the reign of Harun Al-Rashid. The golden age is in us! We must learn from the wisdom of the ancients, but not try to implement their mode, lifestyle, and cultural beliefs in toto in the modern age. Just look at the example of the Prophet. He was the continuation and seal of the message of Islam. His was not a new message, but the message that all the Prophets before him preached. Yet Prophet Muhammad did not try to preach the message as Adam or Abraham or Jesus did. He did not speak of “salaf al salih” and adopt the mannerisms and cultural beliefs of Noah or Lot. The Prophet realized that the times were different, that the people were different, and that the message needed to connect with the people and be relevant to their needs. The divine oneness of Allah supercedes cultural and historical constraints.

Sadik Kassim is a graduate student studying the immune response to sexually transmitted viruses. He may be contacted at shkassim81@yahoo.com